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The determination of an optimal capital structure for commercial
banks has for many years stirred discussion and controversy among scholars,
bankers and regulators. Numerous studies (Peltzman [16], Pringle [17],
Mingo [14], Santomero and Watson [19], Taggart and Greenbauni [22], and
Buser, Chen and Kane [41, to name a few) have explored theoretical and
empirical aspects of bank capital, but the underlying issues have not been
conclusively resolved.
At the same time the issue of optimal capital structure has seen a
resurgence of interest in the corporate finance literature. In recent
years, the effects on corporate capital structure of the tax system
(Miller [12]), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling [91, Smith and Warner [21]),
and bankruptcy costs (Haugen and Senbet [8]),as well as the combined
effects of these factors (DeAngelo and Masulis [5], Barnea, Haugen and
Senbet [1]), have all come under scrutiny.
While these studies in corporate finance have by no means resolved
all the issues either, progress has been made and it seems worthwhile to
analyze the implications of these advances for commercial bank capital
structure. To be sure, several previous papers (Taggart and Greenbaum
[22], Fama [7], and Buser, Chen and Kane[4], for example) have taken the
view that banks are corporations and are thus susceptible to corporate
capital structure theory. The full range of recent developments in this
theory, however, has not yet to our knowledge been brought to bear on the—2—
bank capital decision.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implicationsfor commer-
cial banks of the new developments in capital structure theory.
Specifically, we evaluate and attempt to explainthe marked difference
in leverage between banks and nonfinancial institutions onthe basis of
differences in the fundamental characteristics of theirfinancial liabili-
ties and in the level of regulation and supervision towhich they are
subject. The same framework will be used to analyze the differencesin
leverage between large and small banks.
In Section 1 below we briefly review recent work in corporatefinance
theory on the capital structure effects of taxesand agency costs. In
Section II we discuss the effects of the interactionbetween the tax system
and the production function for financial services oncommercial bank
capital structures. In Section III we analyzethe nature of bankruptcy and
agency costs in banking and theirpotential influence on bank capital.
Finally, in Section IV we summarize and drawconclusions from our analysis.
I. Taxes, Agency Costs and Capital Structure in CorporateFinance Theory
Until just a few years ago, there appeared to be an evolvingconsensus
among corporate finance scholarsthat the primary determinants of the opti—
mal capital structure for a firm were corporate taxesand bankruptcy costs.
Because interest payments are tax—deductible anddividend payments are not,
debt financing was viewed as having a tax advantage over equity,and in
the absence of any offset, debt would be the dominantform of financing.
Increased use of debt, however, entails an increasedrisk of bankruptcy,
which in turn imposes costs on the firm. Not onlyis the bankruptcy—3—
process itself costly because of legal and negotiating costs,but even an
imminent threat of bankruptcy may be costly because it disrupts normal
relationships with suppliers and customers and may force changes in the
firm's investment and financing plans. The prevailing view, then, was
that an optimal capital structure is reached when the present value of
tax savings from an additional dollar of debt is just offset by the present
value of marginal bankruptcy costs.' Furthermore, since the nature of
bankruptcy costs and the firm's susceptibility to them are specific to
the individual firm, these costs were viewed as the primary determinants
of differences in capital structures among a cross section of firms.
This prevailing view has been increasingly challenged, however. It
has been argued that bankruptcy costs are not sufficiently important either
empirically (Warner [23]) or theoretically (Haugen and Senbet [8], to
offset the tax saving from debt. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling [9], have
pointed out that if tax savings are the only advantage to debt,then equity
should be the dominant form of financing in the absence of corporate taxes.
Since this implication is clearly refuted by pre—1913 empirical observation,
they have constructed an alternative theory based on thenotion that an
owner—manager of a firm must enter into costly agency relationshipswith
outside security holders)be they londholders or shareholders. Finally,
Miller [12] has questioned the importance that has been attributed to the
tax—deductibility of interest. He has argued that once personal taxes on
both ordinary income and capital gains are considered, the individual
firm's capital structure may be a matter of indifference at a market
equilibrium.—4—
Since Miller's argument and the agency cost theory play an important
role in our ori analysis, it is useful to review their essential features.
To take the simplest version of Miller's model, consider a world of cer-
tainty in which investors choose among corporate bonds, paying an interest
rate R, tax—exempt bonds, paying an interest rate R, and corporate stock.
Investors pay taxes on income from corporate bonds at the rate tb where
tb may differ across individuals in different tax brackets. Income from
corporate stock, on the other hand, like that from tax—exempt bonds, is
assumed to be free of personal taxes. In addition, corporations pay taxes
on profits at the rate t.
If a corporation retires a dollar of debt it saves R in interest
payments, so that R(l_tc) can be channeled (after taxes) to its
shareholders. Since shares are tax—exempt, the opportunity cost of income
from shares is R, and shareholder wealth would be unchanged by this
operation as long as R(l—t )= R.Value—maximizingfirms will thus have a
c 0
perfectly elastic supply of debt at the interest rate level R =Ro/(l_tc)
because debt and equity can be freely substituted for one another at this
level without affecting the firms' market values.
The aggregate demand for corporate bonds by investors, on the other
hand, will rise with R. As long as tax arbitrage operations are prohibited
(or at least made costly), corporations as a whole will be able to sell
more bonds only by driving up interest rates sufficiently to coax investors
in successively higher tax brackets to hold them. The resulting equili-
brium has been depicted by Miller (1977) with the diagram shown in Figure 1,
*
in which the aggregate amount of corporate debt, B is determinate.—5—
*
Bis that level of debt sufficient to drive the interest rateon corporate
bonds up to R/(l—t). Once that aggregate amount of debt hasbeen issued,
however, any individual firm will be indifferent to furtherchanges in its
capital structure.
Any costs associated with corporate debt, such as bankruptcycosts
or agency costs, can also be incorporated in this framework,as has been
done by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet [1]. Sincebankruptcy and agency costs
make sense only in the presence of uncertainty,however, all rates of re-
turn must now be interpreted as certainty equivalents. Increaseduse of
debt not only increases the chance of default, butas a consequence it
exacerbates the incentive problems that arise between bondholdersand
shareholders. This, in turn, requires increasinglycostly negotiation
and monitoring activities, and the level of interestrates at which the firm
is indifferent between debt and equity financing willno longer be constant.
Rather, as the agency costs of debt rise relative to those ofequity, the
interest rate on corporate debt must fall relative to thecost of equity
(here, the certainty equivalent of the tax—exempt bond rate) in orderfor
the firm to be willing to supply an additional dollar of debi.2The
equilibrium amount of corporate debt will thus be as depicted inFigure 2.
Here there is again an optimal amount of corporate debt in theaggregate,
but unlike the case considered by Miller there will also bean optimal
capital structure at the firm level. Agency costs are firm—specific, and
thus the interest rates at which different firms would bewilling to Supply
a given amount of debt will differ. The aggregate supply curve ofcorpor-
ate bonds must be thought of as a horizontal sum of individual firmsupply—6—
curves. Supply and demand at the aggregate level determine the interest
rate on corporate bonds, and given this rate individual firms determine
their optimal capital structures.
II. Taxes and Commercial Bank Capital Structure
A. A Simple Miller—Type Model of Bank Capital
With these developments in corporate capital structure theory in mind,
we now turn to the capital decision in commercial banks. For the sake of
clarity we will first analyze the impact of tax consideratiors alone on
this decision, deferring until the next section any discussion of agency
problems. e begin with a simple model analogous to that of Miller [l2.
Assume that there is no uncertainty. Commercial banks finance them-
selves by issuing either equity or a single type of deposit, which we will
think of as a savings deposit. As in Miller's model, banks pay corporate
taxes,but the return to investors on their equity is exempt from taxes at
the personal level. The return, R, on bank deposits has two components.
The first is explicit interest, which is taxable to investors at the
rate tb For the time being we assume that RD is unrestricted by re-
gulators (that is, we assume away regulationQ).4 The second component
of R is some amount, S, of services (per dollar of deposits) that are not
taxable to investors. Each unit of services might be thought of as a
package of bookkeeping, liquidity and safekeeping services,and the value
of these services to the marginal depositor will be denoted byV(S).5
It is also assumed for simplicity that banks levy no explicit charge
upon depositors for these services.
The cost to an individual bank of providing these services depends
on the quantity of services provided per dollar of depositsand on the—7—
bank's deposit level. Cost curves for individual banks may then be
summed horizontally to obtain an aggregate cost curve, C =C(S,D),
where S is the level of services per dollar of deposits and D is the
aggregate deposit leveL The deposit market is competitive and, for
simplicity, the quantity of services per dollar of deposits is taken to
be fixed. The more realistic situation in which service levels and ser-
vice charges are allowed to vary is considered further in Section LI.B.
Investors in this model may choose between corporate equity, tax—
exempt bonds and bank deposits.6 The focus here will be on the trade-
off between deposits and equity holdings, which, like tax—exempt bonds,
bear a return of R. The demand curve for deposits represents the level
of gross return, R, on deposits necessary to induce investors to hold a
given quantity, D, of deposits. It is implicit that as holdings of de-
posits increase, holdings of equity are reduced. Since the demand curve
is thus the locus of combinations of R and D for which the marginal inves-
tor would be just willing to substitute deposits for equity, this investor's
marginal after—tax return on deposits, R(l_tb) + V(S) must be equal to
the return on equity,R,anywhere along the curve. Hence at any point
on the curve, both
R=R.D+V(S) (1)
and RD(1_tb) + V(S) =R (2)







Note that without the service element, which is unique to bank deposits,
V(S) =0,and the above equation is identical to Miller's demand curve.
As with the taxable bonds in Miller's model, banks can issue more
deposits by paying a higher rate, R, so as to appeal to investors in






where dt1b/dD is positive. The first term in (4) is thus positive as
long as RD is positive (see (2)). Since the marginal value of services
would be expected to decline as investors receive more of them, we would
also expect the second term to be positive and thus the demand curve will
have a positive slope.
Expression (4) may be further interpreted by noting that if the en-
tire return on deposits were paid in the form of explicit interest, we
would have
./ 1 IR \( dt
I pb . 5
dD
'1j \2fl dD tbl
Ifthe decline in the marginal value of services, dV(S)/dD, is not too
large as more deposits are issued, then expression (4) will be smaller
than expression (5). That is, the gross return need not rise as much to—9—
attract more depositors in expression (4), because a part of that return
comes in non—taxable form. Expression (5) by contrast, is exactly
analogous to Miller's model, in which the interest rate is "grossed up"
to pay the taxes of successively higher tax—bracket investors.
A bank's supply curve for deposits represents the levels of R
necessary to induce the bank to substitute various amounts of deposits
for equity. Since the cost of equity is R, the height of the supply
curve is that level of R such that the after—tax marginal cost of deposits
is equal to R. That is, we must have simultaneously
R =
RD+ V(S),




Again,without the service element this equation is identical to Miller's
supply curve. The shape of the supply curve depends largely on the costs
of providing services. The intercept is at
R =l-t
-C(S,O)/D+ V(S), (8)
and the slope (assuming no individual bank perceives that it hasany—10—
effect on V(S) is
=— . (9)
Hence the slope will be positive negative or flat, depending on whether
the marginal cost of producing services per dollar of deposits is falling,
rising or constant. Moreover, if there is a range of deposits over which
marginal costs decline, the bank would be willing to increase its explicit
interest payments in order to attract these additional deposits.
The resulting equilibrium in the deposit market is depicted in
Figure 3. As in Miller's model, the equilibrium aggregate amount of bank
*
deposits,D ,isdetermined by the intersection of supply and demand.
Unlike Miller's model, however, the costs of producing deposit services
are specific to individual banking firms and thus, apart from the case of
constant returns to scale, the industry equilibrium will also imply an
equilibrium output of deposits for each bank.
Several implications for the relative degree of commercial bank
leverage may be drawn from this model. First, to the extent that payment
of part of the gross return on bank deposits in the form of non—taxable
services tends to flatten the deposit demand curve, banks will be more
highly levered than if their total return were paid in the form of
taxable interest.7 This is depicted in Figure 4.
Second, the imposition of various regulatory costs on banks will
shift the supply curve and, ceteris paribus, will tend to reduce bank
leverage. A reserve requirement of r per dollar of deposits, for example,
acts as a tax upon banks for supplying deposits. Raising a dollar of—11—
loanable funds through deposits will now entail an effective cost of
R/1—r and the supply curve will now be given by
R(l—r)
R —o CS,D)+ —
l—t
c
That is, imposition of a reserve requirement on deposits results in a
parallel downward shift in the supply curve, which consequently reduces
the equilibrium degree of commercial bank leverage.
Finally, the degree of bank leverage will depend on the extent of any
range of economies of scale in the production of deposit services. Generally,
the sooner the range of increasing marginal costs sets in, the sooner the
supply curve will intersect the demand curve and the lower will be the
equilibrium level of deposits. In the presence àf entry regulation,
moreover, the same applies at the individual bank level. In a fully com-
petitive regime competition would drive out all inefficient producers of
deposit services and in equilibrium only banks with identical minimum
average costs could survive. If regulation erects entry barriers for
the lower—cost producers, however, other banks will remain in business,
but their equilibrium capital structurwill be different from those of
the lower—cost banks. This situation is depicted in Figure 5, in which
supply curves for banks A and B are shown.8 The industry supply curve is
the horizontal sum of all individual bank supply curves, and the intersec—
* tionof industry demand and supply determines R ,theequilibrium gross re-
turn on deposits. The optimal degree of leverage for each individual bank
is then determined by the level of deposits on its own supply curve corres—
*
pondingto R .Degreesof leverage will differ in general among banks.—12—
In particular, if marginal costs of producing deposit services turn upward
for smaller banks at lower degrees of leverage than for bigger banks,
smaller banks will tend to be less highlylevered.9
B. Extensions of the Simple Model
Perhaps the most obvious way that the model of ection lILA.
might be extended is to take account of the variety of liabilities ordinarily
issued by commercial banks. Rather than confining themselves to a single
type of deposit, banks simultaneously issue demand deposits, NOW accounts,
passbook savings deposits and large and small scale time deposits of
varying maturities. In addition, many banks make use of more conventional
debt financing. The primary differences among these liabilities are the
varying combinations of services and explicit interest that they represent.
Conventional debt and large—scale CD's, for example, pay investors a
return that is largely in the form of explicit interest with minimal
service packages. These liabilities would be most like the corporate bonds
analyzed in Miller's model, and the same basic principles would apply. In
the absence of bankruptcy or agency costs, tax considerations alone would
dictate a horizontal supply curve for these liabilities, and their equili-
brium quantity would be determinate at the aggregate level, but not at the
level of the individual bank.
The other types of deposits are distinguished primarily by the service
packages they offer, with checking accounts representing the most service—
intensive variety. Essentially, these different types of deposits, as well
as the different minimum balance versus fee arrangements available within
deposit categories, represent attempts to separate the demand curve for
deposits, as described in Section II.A., into a number of separate markets,—13—
each appealing to different depositor characteristics. A deposit account
with no explicit interest payments but large quantities of "free" services
per dollar of deposits, for example, would appeal to both high tax bracket
investors, because of the non—taxable nature of the return, and investors
with high demands for these services. Deposit accounts with high explicit
interest payments and separate charges for services, on the other hand,
would appeal to both low tax—bracket investors and investors with low
demands for services.
Further interpretation of banks' attempts to appeal to different de-
positor clienteles is provided if we think in terms of an overall demand
for deposits that subsumes the various categories of accounts. Referring
to Figure 4 and starting from the vertical axis, we could imagine the first
increment of depositors as being willing to accept an account with low
explicit interest and a minimal service package. Such an account would be
acceptable to both depositors in very low tax brackets and/or those with a
very strong desire for services. The next increment of depositors might
be attracted by a slightly higher explicit interest payment, while the
succeeding increment might be attracted by a slightly better service
package. If moving up the demand curve in this fashion entails variations
in both services and explicit interest, we would expect the demand curve
to be flatter than if only explicit interest could be varied. In the model
of Section II.A., additional depositors could be attracted only by raising
but some of these depositors could have been attracted with smaller
increments in the total return R if the service component were also
variable. The greater is banks' ability to tailor deposits to both the
differing desires and tax brackets of investors, then, the flatter will be—14—
the overall demand curve and the greater will be the equilibrium degree
of leverage for banks in the aggregate.1°
The variety of interest payments and service packages offered by
banks would be determined on the supply side by both regulatory restric-
tions and technological feasibility. A ceiling on rates, such as
Regulation Q, for example, would tend to encourage greater offerings of
free services, but then the authorities may feel compelled to restrict
amounts or types of services as well. Removal of ceilings would tend
to encourage somewhat higher interest rates and greater use of service
charges.11 In terms of technical feasibility, the absence of all
action costs or technological constraints might encourage banks to offer
a different deposit contract to each and every customer, depending on
his tax status and his desire for services.12 Since such extreme
differentiation is infeasible, however, banks will trade off the extra
profits from further differentiation against the costs of creating and
keeping track of additional account categories.
The introduction of these different types of accounts complicates
the details of the analysis and may bring to bear additional factors that
are specific to individual banks on the determination of optimal capital
structure. Nevertheless, the general character of the resulting equili-
brium would still be the same as that described in the model of
the preceding section. Supplies and demands would determine a constella-
tion of gross rates of return on deposits and other liabilities of all types,
and in equilibrium no bank would have any incentive to shift its liability
mix. Cost conditions associated with the production of services (which
may exhibit a considerable degree of jointness across different categories—15—
of deposits), reserve requirements against the various deposits and the
shapes of the demand curves would be the primary determinants of the
relative liability proportions.
Another extension of the basic model of the preceding section involves
the role of deposit insurance. If we think of safety as one of the
services banks provide to their depositors, we can view deposit insurance
as a substitute for the production of safety by banks themselves. In the
absence of deposit insurance, one would expect the benefits of diversifica-
tion, both with respect to asset risk and withdrawal risk, to give larger
banks an advantage over smaller banks in the production of safety)3
This would in turn imply that smaller banks would be less highly levered
in equilibrium than larger banks. In Figure 5, for example, the supply
curve for the smaller banlç A, might turn down sooner, because as A becomes
more highly levered it is forced to invest in less risky assets in order
to provide its depositors the same degree of safety. This in turn forces
down the rate it can offer to depositors to raise more deposit funds. The
larger bank B, on the other hand reaps diversification benefits and this
allows it to be more highly levered.
With deposit insurance, however, the smaller bank's disadvantage in
this respect is reduced. As long as its fee for insurance is a constant
percentage of deposits, the smaller bank's supply curve will tend to
flatten out, and the existence of insurance will thus tend to narrow the
gap between the degree of leverage of large and small banks. The
magnitude of this effect also depends on the proportion of large unin-
sured deposits out of total liabilities. While small banks usually do not
have many uninsured deposits, their existence would tend to widen the
leverage gap of large and small banks. Deposit insurance, of course,—16—
also has a number of incentive effects on bank behavior as well as
effects on the costs of bankruptcy and liquidation. These will be dis-
cussed in more detail in Section III.
A further extension of the basic model of Section II.A. entails
noting that bank equity is not in fact fully tax—exempt. If equity is
i <i<i subject to an effective tax rate t ,where0 —t—t ,thenthe
ps ps pb
equation of the supply curve for deposits becomes
R = Ro -C(S,D)+ V(S). (11)
(l-t)(l-t1)
The higher is t1 ,theeffective tax rate on stock returns for the mar—
Ps
ginal purchaser of corporate stock, the higher is the intercept of the
supply curve. In turn, a parallel upward shift in the supply curve will
tend, other things equal, to increase the degree of commercial bank
leverage. Higher dividend payments by commercial banks, then, will tend
to increase the effective tax rate on stock returns and will be associated
with greater leverage. Our model offers no explanation, however, of
bank dividend policy.
Finally, it should be noted that the role of the supply curve in our
analysis is valid even in the absence of taxes, as long as the costs of
producing bank services are lower than V(s) .Thismay explain the re-
latively high leverage ratios in commercial banks that existed already at
the beginning of this century. For instance, the ratio of capital to
total bank assets was roughly 20 percent between 1900 and l915 As taxes
were gradually increased, there was a parallel rise in bank leverage so—17-
that the ratio of capital to total assets for all U.S. commercial banks
was 7.4 percent at the end of 1980.16 While this increase in bank
leverage can be attributed to other factors,such as increasing bank re-
gulation and supervision, it is clear that the tax system had an important
role in this development.
III. Bankruptcy Costs, Agency Costs and Commercial Bank Capital Structure
Jensen and Meckling [9] list three categories of costs associated
with debt: bankruptcy costs, the perverse incentive effects associated
with highly levered firms, and the monitoring costs engendered by these
incentive effects. In commercial banking, the form and magnitude of all
three types of costs are intimately bound to the system of bankregulation
and particularly the deposit insurance system. We will treat bankruptcy
costs first and then turn to incentive and monitoring costs.
There is a general presumption that the probability of bankruptcy
is lower in banking than in other industries. The reasons for this
assumption are twofold: first, the degree of regulation and supervision
by bank regulatory agencies is probably stronger than in any other industry,
and it is expected that this tight control may reduce undue risks that
could lead to bankruptcy. Second, it is widely believed that at least
the largest banks will not be allowed to fail in order to avoidpoten-
tially serious damages to the monetary system. While there is no formal
or even informal support for this assertion, the resolution of large bank
failures in the 1970's through assumption (takeover) rather than payoff
(liquidation) reenforces this belief. Consequently, large uninsured de-
positors could be expected to be less concerned about bankruptcy than—18--
corporate bondholders in other industries, and this may contribute to a
reduction of indirect bankruptcy costs.
Direct bankruptcy costs are also likely to be lower for commercial
banks than for nonfinancial corporations. In analyzing this issue it is
helpful to make a distinction between liquidation and bankruptcy as was
suggested by Haugen and Senbet [8]. Clearly, the cost of liquidating
financial assets is lower than the cost of liquidating most real assets
due to the existence of relatively efficient capital andmoney markets
17
even at the local level. As far as direct bankruptcy costs are concerned,
it can be argued that the existence of a specialized liquidation division
within the FDIC is likely to reduce the various search, legal,bookkeeping
and other costs and fees related to actual bankruptcy. Inaddition, the
FDIC has coercive powers to impose a reorganization planupon a failed
bank, typically by having some other bank assume the failed bank's deposits.
To the extent that this reduces negotiating costs and problems ofone or
more groups holding out on a reorganization plan in an attempt to increase
their share of the proceeds, it may be that less damage is done to the
going concern value of banks in bankruptcy than to other types of firm.
The presence of deposit insurance also contributes to making deposits
more perfectly substitutable across banks, and this may ease the transition
problems associated with finding new management and maintaining continuity
in existing customer relationships. For these reasons, marginalbankruptcy
costs for a given degree of leverage may be less in the presence of banking
regulation and the deposit insurance system than for nonfinancial firms,
and banks may thus have a tendency to maintain higher degrees ofleverage
than these firms.—19—
Turning to the resolution of incentive problems, it is again
apparent that the deposit insurance system plays a key part. It has
been widely recognized (see Scott and Mayer [20], or Merton [11], for
example) that the availability of deposit insurance at a fee that does
not vary with the bank's risk of bankruptcy will exacerbate the perverse
incentive problems associated with highly levered firms. Without any
offsetting measures by the FDIC, in fact, banks would be likely to raise
very little equity at all.
Buser, Chen and Kane [4] have argued, however, that the FDIC's regula-
tory authority, and in particular its ability to deprive a bank of future
profits inherent in its charter, acts as an implicit risk—related deposit
insurance premium. That is, short—term losses in an excessively levered
bank could result in a temporarily negative net worth (in accounting
terms) which, in turn, would force the FDIC to reorganize or liquidate the
bank even if the present value of future profits is positive. Optimal bank
capital is determined, therefore, by a tradeoff between tax savings and the
implicit costs of regulatory interference.
Two points may be made concerning the Buser, Chen and Kane argument.
The first is that it may be applied to a more broadly construed notion of
agency problems, and this strengthens the prediction that banks will not
be totally levered. Smith and Warner [21], have categorized four types of
perverse incentives that a firm's shareholders may have to act against the
interests of bondholders: substitution of riskier assets after the debt
contract has been agreed upon, excessive payment of dividends, assuming
liabilities of equal or higher priority to that of existing creditors, and
underinvestment in profitable future opportunities. Each of these problems—20—
arise because the debt contract is not renegotiated even when the firm
takes actions that would affect the market value of the debtholders'
position. Thus the asset substitution, dividend payment and claim dilution
motives arise because of opportunities to shift wealth from debtholders to
shareholders. Similarly, the underinvestment incentive arises because the
shareholders wish to avoid enhancing the debtholders' wealth at their own
expense. If debt contracts were continuously renegotiated as the firm
changed any of its policies, however, the value of the debt would be insula-
ted from the effects of these changes, and shareholders would be motivated
to take only those actions that enhance the net present value of the
entire firm.
In commercial banking, the FDIC becomes the main claimant in the event
of bankruptcy and it is thus in the FDIC's interest to take steps that will
reduce the bank's incentive to erode the value of its position. Such steps
include monitoring the risk of the bank's assets as well as its capital
position, and in extreme cases closing the bank if the FDIC's position is
unduly threatened. Thus, regulation and supervision of banks by the FDIC
take the place of monitoring activities that might otherwise be undertaken
by the bank's creditors. If the costs imposed on banks by this supervision
increase as the risk of bankruptcy increases, as suggested by Buser, Chen
and Kane, then the FDIC's activities also serve the same role as contin-
uous renegotiation with debtholders. The bank's incentive to substitute
assets, pay excessive dividends or dilute the debtholders claim by, say,
reducing capital is reduced because any of these activities will cause im-
plicit penalties to be imposed by the FDIC. By the same token, if the
bank is implicitly rewarded by a lessening of these costs for adopting—21—
policies that bolster the value of the FDIC's claim, it will not have
an incentive to underinvest in profitable future opportunities. In all,
the FDIC's regulatory and supervisory activities can serve as a mechanism
by which the costs of agency problems and bankruptcy are transmitted back
to a bank's shareholders, and thus they help explain why a bank would not
find it optimal to be totally levered.
The second point to be noted about this argument, however, is
that it can cut two ways. While it may explain why commercial
banks are not totally levered, itmay also help explain why banks are
nevertheless more highly levered than most types of firms. As hasbeen
noted above, the FDIC's activities are a substitute foranalogous privately—
produced monitoring and contracting activities. The FDIC'ssupervisory
authority and its cooperation with other bank regulatory agenciesmay
make these monitoring activities more efficient andmore effective than
would be possible among purely private creditors.Furthermore, to the
extent that any of these monitoring costs are absorbed by society atlarge
through the regulatory system, rather than the private parties to the
deposit contract, greater leverage by banks may be encouraged.
To put the general thrust of this section into the context of the
analysis of preceding sections, it is useful to refer back to Figure 2.
The Buser, Chen and Kane argument implies that the supplycurve of deposits
will have some downward slope because of the regulatory costsimposed on
banks at higher degrees of leverage. Nevertheless, the nature of the
FDIC's activities suggests that the downward slope of thissupply curve
will be more gentle than that of the supply curve forordinary debt by
a nonfinancial corporation. Hence we would expect that bankruptcy and
agency cost considerations, similar to tax considerations, point to higher
degrees of leverage for banks than for other types of firms.—22—
IV.Summaryand Conclusions
The theory of corporate capital structure that has evolved in recent
years provides a useful framework for analyzing bank capital structure.
There are, however, several fundamental differences between commercial
banks and nonfinancial firms that contribute to a large disparity in their
degree of leverage.
The first major distinction between commercial banking and other in-
dustries is the nature of bank liabilities. Banks raise most of their
funds in the form of deposits that offer different combinations of inter-
est and services such as liquidity, safety, and bookkeeping. Since the
cost of producing these services is tax deductible to the banks but the
benefits from the services are tax free to the depositors, deposits have
an obvious tax advantage over corporate bonds. Moreover, the production
function of bank services is likely to have economies of scale properties
that will further increase the aggregate equilibrium amount of outstanding
deposits. Since service production costs are bank—specific, the resulting
equilibrium will also determine optimal leverage for individual banks.
The second major difference between commercial banks and nonfinancial
firms is the regulatory environment. Banks are probably more closely re-
gulated and supervised than any other industry. This environment reduces
both the probability and cost of bankruptcy for commercial banks. Moreover,
the special function of deposit insurance creates a unique role for theFDIC
as a major principal (in addition to shareholders) in all insured banks. The
substantial regulatory and supervisory powers of the FDIC relative to
private creditors of nonfinancial firms are likely to reduce agency costs.
For instance, periodic bank examinations represent a monitoring device that—23—
mayreduceasset substitution and other actions that could be taken by
shareholders at the expense of depositors.
The combined effect of the tax—free service component in deposits
and the reduced agency costs due to tougher regulation helps to explain
the consistently higher degree of leverage observed in banks vis—a—vis
nonfinancial firms. Moreover, the same framework could explain the fact
that large banks traditionally have lower capital—to—asset ratios than
small banks. This observation can be attributed to higher costs ofpro-
ducing bank services and to a higher perceived probability and cost of
bankruptcy. The latter maybedue to the greater incidence of liquidation
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1. See Robichek and Myers [18] or Kraus and Litzenberger [10] for expo-
sitions of this theory. It is this theory that underlies the model of
optimal bank capital structure in Buser, Chen and Kane [4].
2.In keeping with Barnea, Haugen and Senbet [1], we assume for simplicity
that equity entails no agency costs. If that assumption were relaxed,
the suppiy curve for debt would have a higher intercept and at least
in the initial range,a more gentle downward slope, because up to
some level) issuance of debt and retirement of equity would serve to
reduce total agency costs.
3. Barnea, Haugen and Senbet [1], also emphasize that tax arbitrage
operations (such as borrowing at the taxable rate and purchasing tax—
exempt bonds) must be prohibited or at least made costly to investors
in order to maintain the upward slope of the demand curve for corporate
debt. We implicitly make this same assumption in our analysis in
Section II.
4.The impact of constraints on will be discussed further in Section II.B.
5.Commercial banks are not absolutely alone, of course, in their ability
to offer such services. Money market mutual funds and thrift
institutions, for example, compete with banks in providing such services,
and to the extent that they do, the basic analysis of this section
applies to them as well. Nevertheless, largely because of regulatory
restrictions on other institutions, banks are unique in terms of the
precise range of services that they offer.6. In the more realistic case in which investors could also choose
corporate bonds, financial intermediary liabilities, and other in-
vestment vehicles, all securities markets would equilibrate simultan-
eously and the shape of the demand curve for deposits would reflect
the availability of these substitute instruments. Our analysis in
this section may best be thought of, then, as a mode.l of equilibrium
in the banking industry that is implicitly imbedded in a general
equilibrium model.
7.As indicated in expression (4), whether or not the slope of the demand
curve is flatter when part of R is paid in the form of non—taxable
services depends on how the marginal value of these services changes
with the deposit level. The demand curve without services could not
lie everywhere below the demand curve with services, for then banks
would never provide services. There may be some point, however, where
the demand curve with services crosses, and hence is steeper than, the
demand curve without services. As long as this point occurs beyond
*
Din Figure 4, the provision of services will tend to increase bank
leverage.
8. The horizontal axis in Figure 5 is Dlv, or deposits relative to the
value of the bank. This yardstick is used to emphasize differing de-
grees of relative leverage. Since the total size, V, of each bank is
held constant throughout the preceding analysis, changing the axis to
D/V does not necessitate any fundamental alterations.
9.This implication is generally in accord with empirical observation
for commercial banks in the U.S. For instance, the average capital!
assets ratio for national banks with total assets over five billiondollars was 4.75 percent in 1978 compared with a ratio of 8.49
percent for national banks with assets less than 10 million dollars
(see Dince and Fortson [6], p. 51). This finding is also consistent
with empirical studies of bank costs, which generally report at
least some range of economies of scale
10. This flittening of the demand curve because of the greater flexibility
that varying types of accounts offer to depositors is analogous to
the flattening of the demand curve for bonds that occurs in Barnea,
Haugen and Senbet [1], when the possibility of tax arbitrage is in-
troduced. By combining bond purchases with tax arbitrage operations,
individual investors, in effect, tailor the bonds to their own
portfolio needs, and thus the increases in interest rates necessary
to induce investors to purchase additional bonds are smaller than if
tax arbitrage operations were prohibited.
11. It should be noted, however, that in the face of personal taxes a
complete "unbundling" of services on deposits is unlikely. Because
services are not taxable to investors, we would always expect banks
to find it profitable to offer some amount of "free" or at least
subsidized services and correspondingly reduced interest payments,
even if the banks could offer any interest rate they wished.
12. This is similar to Black's [2] notion that in a frictionless world
each investor would hold his own corporation for tax purposes. Thus
"every corporation has a clientele of one investor, and chooses its
capital structure to fit that investor's needs."
13. Implicit here is the notion that depositors place a value on bank—
produced safety, for which "homemade" diversification does not providea perfect substitute, as it does, say in standard corporate
finance discussions of conglomerate mergers or firm diversification.
14. The association between higher dividends and higher personal tax
rates on stock implicitly assumes that tax arbitrage operations,
such as described by Miller & Scholes [13], are costly for investors.
15. See Orgier and Wolkowitz [15], Figure 5.1 (p. 90).
16. Federal Reserve Bulletin, [3], Table 1.25 (p.A17).
17. The same, of course, holds for rionbank financial institutions, which
are also typically more highly levered than nonfinancial corporations.References
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